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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20010147-CA 
vs. 
RICHARD L. HOLBERT, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated kidnapping, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999), in the Second Judicial District, Weber 
County, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(4) & 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it admitted evidence that defendant previously assaulted 
his wife, where that evidence was relevant to establish defendant's motive and intent 
and to show a specific pattern of behavior toward the victim? 
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior bad acts for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,1 42, 28 P.3d 1278. 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence obtained without a search warrant 
from defendant's abandoned apartment? 
When addressing a suppression ruling, this Court reviews a trial court's factual 
findings "deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard" and its conclusions of law 
"for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to 
the underlying factual findings." See State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, f 6, 18 P.3d 1116 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-940 (Utah 1994)). 
3. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to certain testimony, 
not requesting certain instructions, or not adequately preparing defense witnesses? 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed 
as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f 20, 984 P.2d 376. 
4(a). Did evidence that defendant kept his victim from escaping her home at gunpoint 
support his conviction for aggravated kidnapping? 
When addressing an insufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court reviews "the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). 
The Court will find the evidence insufficient only when, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the verdict, the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that "reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he [or she] was convicted." Id. (alteration in original). 
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4(b). Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial based 
on his argument that the aggravated kidnapping charge should have merged with an 
aggravated assault charge dismissed prior to trial? 
Merger of criminal offenses is an issue of statutory construction and is reviewed 
for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court. State v. Pier son, 
2000 UT App 274, f 8, 12 P.3d 103, cert, denied, 20 P.3d 403. 
5. Were trial errors, if any, cumulatively harmful? 
"Under the cumulative error doctrine, [a reviewing court] will reverse only if the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [the court's] confidence . . . that a 
fair trial was had." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) (1999) 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated assault and aggravated 
kidnapping. R. 1-2. On November 6, 2000, just before trial commenced, the State moved 
to dismiss the aggravated assault count, and the trial court granted the motion. R. 123. 
Defendant was tried before a jury. Jury instructions, submitted without objection, 
informed the jury of the elements of aggravated kidnapping, of "the lesser offense of 
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aggravated assault," and of "the lesser offense of unlawful detention." R. 89-91. The 
verdict form provided the jury with four choices: 
"GUILTY of the charge of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony; or 
"GUILTY of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony; or 
"GUILTY of the lesser included offense of unlawful detention, a class B 
misdemeanor, or 
"NOT GUILTY." 
R. 120. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that even if the jury were to believe 
the State's witnesses, defendant had, at most, committed aggravated assault. R. 221:106-
107. The prosecutor argued that its evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping. R. 221:110. 
The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping. R. 120; 221:112. The 
trial court sentenced defendant to "an indeterminate term of not less than ten years and 
which may be [for] life." R. 205-206. Defendant timely appealed. R. 208. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Suann Palmer and defendant were married November 12, 1988. R. 220:97. They 
had five children. On August 12, 1999, the date of the offense, Michael was approximately 
ten; Austin, eight; Alexis, seven; Stephanie, five; and Kylee, three. Id. 
Suann Palmer's Testimony 
Ms. Palmer testified that she and her husband had argued during May, 1999. Id. 
at 99. On May 18, 1999, during one of these arguments, defendant "picked [her] up 
by [her] neck and choked [her] unconscious." Id. at 101. He threw her approximately 
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four or five feet into the kitchen, causing her to hit the kitchen table. Id. She blacked 
out several times during the incident and, upon regaining consciousness, found that he 
was still choking her. Id. He finally stopped when she "went into the survivor mode1' 
and said, "Please don't kill me, I wan[t] [to] make this marriage work." Id. When her 
father took her to the hospital an hour and a half later, she had bruises on her buttocks 
and fingerprints on her neck and was experiencing pain. Id. at 103. 
Ms. Palmer reported the incident to the police and secured a protective order the 
following day. Id. at 103-104. The protective order prohibited defendant from coming 
to the home or harassing Ms. Palmer. Id. at 104-105. It permitted defendant to call 
Ms. Palmer regarding the children. Id. at 105. 
Between May 19 and August 12, Ms. Palmer and her children stayed with her parents. 
Id. at 105. They visited their home for a few hours on some days to do laundry and 
to permit the children to play in their rooms, and they stayed at their home on two 
consecutive nights during June. Id. at 105-106. On the second night, someone tried 
to pry open the front window. Id. at 107. Ms. Palmer called the police, but the person 
at the window was gone when the officers arrived. Id. at 108. 
On August 12, Ms. Palmer and her children were at the family home during the 
day. Ms. Palmer was in the backyard chaining up the dog and talking on the phone with 
her friend, Michelle Causey, when three-year-old Kylee came into the backyard and 
said, "Daddy's here." Id. at 113-115. Defendant confronted Ms. Palmer on the patio, 
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telling her he had come for his bowling ball. Id. at 115. Ms. Palmer told her friend 
Michelle, "He's here. Come now." Id. at 116. 
Ms. Palmer went to the front door to get defendant's bowling ball. Id. at 118. 
Defendant followed. Id. Ms. Palmer asked defendant to wait at the door while she got 
his bowling ball. Id. Defendant, however, shoved her inside the door, slammed the 
door behind him, locked the door with one hand, and pulled a gun from his waistband 
with the other. Id. at 118-119. He then pointed the gun at her head. Id. at 121. 
Ms. Palmer ran to the back door. Id. She had the door unlocked and open about 
two inches when defendant slammed it shut. Id. at 123. He locked the back door, then 
grabbed her and threw her into the bedroom. Id. at 123-124. Defendant closed the bedroom 
door and held the gun toward Ms. Palmer's head. Id. at 125. He said, "You want a 
divorce? You are going to die. I'm going to kill you." Id. 
Although thinking she was going to die, Ms. Palmer calmed herself. Id. at 126. 
Sitting on the edge of the bed with the gun pointed toward her, she told defendant, "I've 
been looking for you. I've been trying to find you. I've called your work. I've tried 
to look for you everywhere. I've—I've thought a lot about it, and I don't want a divorce. 
I wan[t] [to] make this marriage work." Id. Meanwhile, "the children were all screaming 
and ringing the doorbell." Id. 
Defendant appeared distracted, either because of Ms. Palmer's statements or the 
children at the door or both. Id. Ms. Palmer continued, "It doesn't have to be like this. 
Let's get in the car. Let's take all five children and let's leave the state." Id. 
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Defendant then opened the bedroom door, walked to the front door, unlocked the 
door, and put his gun in his waistband. Id. at 127. He turned to Ms. Palmer and said, 
"When the police come, you're go[ing] to defend me, right?" Id. Ms. Palmer answered, 
"Right." Id. 
Defendant walked out the front door just as Michelle Causey arrived. Id. Defendant 
took off through the back yard. Id. Ms. Palmer helped get the children into Ms. Causey's 
car and then ran across the street, screaming, "He has a gun[.] [H]e has a gun." Id. 
at 128. 
The Children's Testimony 
Defense counsel interviewed four of the five children at the Children's Justice Center. 
State's Exhibit 14. Michael was not interviewed; and Kylee, the youngest, did not respond 
to interview questions. Id. Austin, Alexis, and Stephanie, however, answered counsel's 
questions about the August 12 incident. Id.; R. 220:233-235. The interview was taped, 
and the videotape was entered into evidence and played for the jury.1 R. 220:232-235. 
All three children stated that defendant tossed some coins onto the ground in front 
of the house shortly before he entered the home with their mother. State's Exhibit 14. 
Austin stated that he did not attempt to pick up the coins. Id. 
lNo transcript of the videotape is included with the rec( i The quoted material in 
this section was informally transcribed during the preparation of this brief. 
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After their parents entered the home, Michael and Austin began ringing the doorbell 
and knocking on the door. Id. Austin testified that defendant was wearing a jacket over 
his shirt. Id. 
The three girls went next door to the home of their neighbor, Pat Dodge, and asked 
her to call 911. Id. Stephanie testified that she and her sisters went to Ms. Dodge's 
home "so my mom wouldn't get killed." Id. Asked why she was afraid that her mother 
might be killed, she said, "Because he had the gun and he wanted us." Id. Asked how 
she knew that defendant had the gun, she answered, "Because you could see it. It was 
tucked in [the] front [of his] pants." Id. She then pointed to the front of her own waist. 
Id. Asked whether the other children had seen the gun, she said she didn't know. Id. 
Asked when she first saw the gun, she said she saw the gun when defendant "walked 
by, when he was going to the door." Id. She also saw the gun when defendant threw 
the coins. Id. 
Craig Rollins *s Testimony 
Craig Rollins testified that he placed a classified advertisement in the Ogden Standard 
Examiner in May, 1999, offering for sale a Ruger SP-101 .357 magnum gun. R. 220, 
197. Rollins made a copy of the advertisement as it ran on May 14. Id. at 194; State's 
Exhibit 11. Rollins indicated that the ad ran just three days and that, to the best of his 
recollection, he sold the gun within three days. R. 220:197-199. Rollins testified that 
defendant was the purchaser. Id. at 200. 
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Messages Left on Ms. Palmer's Answering Machine 
Danielle Croyle, a domestic violence investigator with the Ogden police department, 
went to Ms. Palmer's home on August 13, the day after the incident, to retrieve the tape 
from Ms. Palmer's telephone answering machine. Id. at 204, 224, 227. That tape and 
a transcript of the tape were entered into evidence. Id. at 226, 227; State's Exhibits 
12, 13. The transcript was given to the jury to follow while they listened to the tape. 
R. 220:227. The tape contained a number of messages from defendant. State's Exhibit 
13. Defendant's comments, made after the incident on the morning of August 12 but 
before the retrieval of the tape on August 13, include the following: 
"This morning I wanted to show you how sad and mad and frustrated and 
hurt and disappointed and lonely I am. You know the story[.] I'd rather not 
live th[a]n to live a life without you and our children in it . . . I might have 
scared you but I hope you'll come to realize how much I hurt." 
"Hell I'm a tormented fellow and on the other side I'm going to be tormented. 
This morning wasn't about you Suanne. This morning was about me and 
uh heck I'd sure like to go with just a little happiness. To be able to talk to 
you one more time it's the only way that I can make you feel safe, 
"I don't want to wander this road Suanne[.] I just want it to end and it is 
going to end sometime tonight[.] I'm going to end it so when you wake up 
tomorrow . . . you won't have to worry about me no more. . . . If you can 
find it in your heart please find a way, to uh, not hate me and to get me buried 
okay." 
"I'm not a bad person Suanne. I, I feel like I was made to get desperate and 
desperate I got and I acted out of desperation." 
"I'm sorry Suanne, uh I hope you know I don't think you do but I know I, 
I never really meant to hurt you. I did mean to scare you to kind of show 
you what I've been going through." 
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"Another thing is anything in my apartment is yours, there's not a whole lot 
Throw anything you want in the dumpster I don't (unintel). I would be out 
by Friday." 
State's Exhibit 13. 
Evidence Found at Defendant's Apartment 
On an unspecified date near the time of the August 12 incident, defendant left a 
note for the manager of the apartments where he lived and did maintenance work. 
R. 221:64. The note said that he was quitting his job. Id. The manager waited a number 
of days, but heard nothing more from defendant. Id. at 65. The manager therefore entered 
defendant's apartment to inspect it and found he had left some items there. Id. Upon 
the advice of her attorney, the manager then closed the apartment and posted it for 
abandonment. Id. After the requisite number of days had passed, the manager determined 
that the apartment was abandoned and could be re-rented. Id. Before boxing the items 
left m the apartment, she contacted Detective Danielle Croyle to allow her to search 
the apartment. Id. at 65-66. Detective Croyle checked defendant's caller ID registration 
and found that its last entry had been recorded on August 3. Id. at 72. 
Defendant's Testimony 
Defendant presented a different version of the facts. He testified that Ms. Palmer 
called him on the evening of August 11, 1999, told him that she had changed her mind 
about their "marriage situation," and invited him to come over the next morning. 
R. 220:307-308. She said that she had "had the protective order just dropped, dismissed." 
Id at 317 
10 
While defendant was on his way to Ms. Palmer's home on August 12, his radiator 
overheated. Id. at 308. He therefore parked his car about two blocks away and walked 
the remaining distance to the home. Id. 
When he arrived, Austin and Alexis asked him whether he had any change. Id. 
at 314. When Austin held up his hands for the money, defendant placed some coins 
in Austin's hands, and some of the coins spilled onto the ground. Id. Defendant did 
not "toss" the children any coins. Id. 
Defendant found Ms. Palmer in the yard and heard her tell someone on her cell 
phone, "He's here." Id. at 316. Ms. Palmer told the children to get in the car. Id. at 
318. Defendant did not understand why she wanted the children in the car when they 
were going to visit. Id. at 319. Ms. Palmer told defendant to come into the house with 
her or the children would not get in the car. Id. Ms. Palmer closed the front door. Id. 
at 320. 
Defendant asked for his copy of the restraining order. Id. Ms. Palmer told him 
it was in the bedroom closet and allowed him to go get it. Id. While in the bedroom, 
defendant saw a gun on the dresser. Id. at 323. Defendant recognized the gun. Id. at 
324. He had purchased it for Ms. Palmer in early June because she wanted it for protection 
after he moved out of the house. Id. at 334. 
Ms. Palmer suddenly pulled the gun from its holster, pointed it at him, and said, 
"Why can't you be just like other guys and just leave." Id. at 325-327. Then she said, 
"If I gotta kill ya, I'll kill ya." Id. at 327. Defendant wrested the gun from her. Id. 
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at 328. Because the incident had caused him to "feel so many emotions," he pointed 
the gun back at her. Id, Then Ms. Palmer said that things did not have to be as they 
were, that she had been looking for him, and that she did not want a divorce. Id. at 329. 
Defendant began walking to the front door, grabbed the holster, and pocketed the 
gun. Id. at 329-330. On the way out, he said, "You tricked me, . . . didn't you?" Id. 
at 330. He believed that Ms. Palmer really had intended to kill him, but he also felt 
that "she got [him] over there under a ruse to get [him] in trouble." Id. at 300, 331. 
Before leaving he asked her whether, when the police came, she would stick up for him. 
Id. She said that she would. Id. As defendant left, she asked him to call her in forty-five 
minutes. Id. at 332. 
Forty-seven days passed between the incident and defendant's arrest. On direct 
exam, defendant said of this period, "I didn't leave the state, but when I left this area, 
the day I was arrested, I was coming back to—to Ogden to turn myself in." R. 221:16-33. 
On cross-examination, however, he recounted renting a motel in Ogden, walking to St. 
George, traveling to Georgia, and then returning to Clearfield where he was arrested. 
Id. at 64-65. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Testimony that defendant had previously assaulted his wife was relevant to show 
motive and intent. It was also relevant to show background and foundation for the charged 
offense and to show defendant's pattern of behavior toward a specific victim—his estranged 
spouse. Further, it was relevant to rebut defendant's fabrication and justification defenses. 
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2. The tnal court properly admitted evidence of the caller ID register found at defendant's 
apartment after defendant had abandoned the apartment and after the manager had 
completed abandonment procedures. Defendant no longer had a justifiable expectation 
of privacy in the premises and had no standing to contest a search. Further, even if 
defendant had a justifiable expectation of privacy, the police investigator acted under 
a reasonable belief that the apartment manager had authority to consent to the search. 
In any event, admission of the caller ID register was harmless. 
3. Defendant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was deficient or that counsel's 
allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him. Failure to make futile objections and 
requests for instructions is not deficient performance. Acts and omissions that may have 
been sound trial strategy, including deliberate and tactical choices not to focus the jury's 
attention on matters unfavorable to defendant, also do not establish inadequate performance. 
In any event, defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for the 
alleged deficiencies, the verdict would likely have been more favorable. 
4(a). The evidence sufficed to support a finding that defendant intentionally and knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, seized, confined, detained, 
and transported the victim. Further, it sufficed to show that defendant possessed and 
threatened the use of a gun while confining the victim and, alternatively, that he seized 
and confined her with the intent to inflict bodily injury or terrorize her. 
4(b). Defendant's aggravated kidnapping charge could not merge with the aggravated 
assault charge that was dismissed before trial. The merger doctrine is applicable only 
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to convictions, not to charges. Further, no merger occurs when a defendant is convicted 
of a single crime. 
5. Defendant has identified no error. The cumulative error doctrine is therefore 
inapplicable. If errors occurred, their cumulative effect does not undermine confidence 
in the verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT HAD PREVIOUSLY ASSAULTED 
HIS WIFE WAS RELEVANT TO ESTABLISH HIS MOTIVE AND 
INTENT AND TO SHOW A SPECIFIC PATTERN OF BEHAVIOR 
TOWARD HER 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it permitted Ms. Palmer to testify 
to defendant's May 18 assault—the choking incident that caused her to seek hospital 
care and to secure a protective order. Br. Aplt. at 21. He argues that the testimony "was 
used to prove [his] character . . . in order to show action in conformity therewith." Id. 
at 21-22. 
Defendant argued below that testimony about the assault would be inadmissible 
unless introduced to show "intent or opportunity or motive or something like that or 
preparation.'* R. 220:99. The trial court then asked the prosecutor whether the testimony 
showed intent or motive. Id. The prosecutor indicated that it was relevant to show both 
intent and motive and for other non-propensity purposes. Id, The trial court ruled the 
testimony admissible. Id. 
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This court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes under 
an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 42, 28 P.3d 1278; 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). 
When analyzing the admissibility of other crimes, the trial court must determine "(1) 
whether the evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character purpose under 404(b), 
(2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence 
meets the requirements of rule 403." Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 20. 
Here, as explained below, the trial court properly determined that the testimony 
was offered for non-character purposes. Among other proper purposes, the testimony 
was relevant to show defendant's motive and intent to commit the proscribed behavior 
and to establish a specific pattern of behavior toward the victim, defendant's wife. 
A. Evidence of defendant's prior assault on his wife was admissible for proper 
noncharacter purposes. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, governs the admissibility of prior bad acts 
evidence. It provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,.... 
The permissible purposes detailed by the rule are not exclusive. Decorso, 1999 
UT 57, f 24; see also Campbell v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins., 2001 UT 89, f 75, 432 
Utah Adv. Rep. 44, cert granted, U.S. , 2002 WL 386410. Evidence of other 
crimes may be admitted for any proper non-character purpose. See id.; see also State 
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v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, % 25, 6 P.3d 1120 (testimony by other victims of prior 
rapes admissible to show lack of consent). In other words, while other crimes evidence 
is not admissible merely to show propensity, it is admissible when relevant to non-character 
purposes even though it may unavoidably tend to show the defendant's propensity to 
commit certain acts. 
1. Motive 
As a general rule, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence is relevant and 
admissible to prove motive to commit charged offenses, especially where the perpetrator 
and the victim involved in the charged offense are the same two people involved in prior 
incidents. See, e.g., State v. Linkenauger, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868 (Cal App. 1995) (broader 
range of evidence may be presented to show motive, intent, and identity where the prior 
misconduct and charged offense involve[] the identical perpetrator and victim), Baker 
v. State, No. CR-95-0292, 2001 WL 32832, at *38-39 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 12, 2001) 
(not yet released for publication) (citing cases from numerous jurisdictions permitting 
prior misconduct evidence in domestic violence cases involving an identical perpetrator 
and victim). In domestic violence cases, a perpetrator's motive to harm his spouse or 
intimate partner often has its origin in the perpetrator's anger or jealousy toward his 
partner. Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the Criminal 
Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 16 Pace L. Rev. 73, 78 (1995). To understand 
the perpetrator's motive, the trier of fact needs to understand the relationship between 
the defendant and the victim, particularly any history of hostility and controlling behaviors. 
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Because the perpetrator's motive to harm his spouse or intimate partner is often rooted 
in jealousy, anger over the dissolution of the relationship, and loss of control over her 
actions, "there is an inextricable connection between the reason a defendant would commit 
the crimes charged and his past conduct toward the victim." Id. at 78; cf. State v. Tanner, 
675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983) (holding admissible testimony of prior violent acts where 
child abuse charge involved identical perpetrator and victim); State v. Reed, 2000 UT 
68, U 26, 8 P.3d 1025 (concluding that evidence of prior acts of child sexual abuse were 
admissible to show the defendant's pursuit of the same victim to gain opportunity to 
commit unlawful sexual acts). 
In the instant case, testimony of defendant's assault upon his wife and her decision 
to seek a protective order was admissible to establish that defendant had a motive for 
the violent acts that constituted his criminal behavior. Defendant's May 18 assault on 
his wife demonstrated his hostility toward her. Ms. Palmer's success in procuring a 
protective order following the incident, defendant's enforced separation from her, the 
dissolution of the relationship, and defendant's loss of control are all motives for the 
August 12 offense. 
2. Intent 
Domestic violence history evidence is also relevant to show intent. As defendant 
does here, a defendant may claim in a domestic violence burglary or kidnapping, that 
his intent in entering the victim's home or shutting the door was not to commit a crime 
against his spouse or intimate partner, "but merely to 'talk' with [her], thus asserting 
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an innocent explanation" for an otherwise unlawful entry or confinement. See id at 
79. 
This Court has previously held testimony of other crimes admissible to demonstrate 
intent. State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990), involved the undisputed attempt 
by a defendant to pressure his victim, a pizza delivery person, into giving him cash. 
The victim testified that the defendant "pressed an object to [the victim's] neck and told 
[the victim] that he was being robbed." Id. at 293. The defendant denied the use of 
a weapon and said that he was attempting to collect a drug debt. Id. The trial court 
admitted evidence of defendant's guilty plea to a similar robbery of another pizza delivery 
person. Id. at 294. This Court affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that this evidence 
was relevant to whether the defendant intended to commit a robbery. Id. at 295. 
Similarly, in State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 22, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld a trial court ruling admitting other crimes evidence (alleged rapes of other victims) 
offered to show that a defendant intended to rape a victim and that the victim did not 
consent. 
Here, evidence of the May 18 assault helped demonstrate defendant's intent when 
he went to Ms- Palmer's home, in violation of a protective order, on August 12. That 
evidence helped demonstrate that defendant's intent was not innocent, as he claimed, 
and that he did indeed intend to commit a crime when he went to the home. 
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3. Background and behavior toward a particular victim 
Testimony about past incidents of domestic violence is also relevant as necessary 
background and foundational material to help the trier of fact understand the nature of 
the crime or to explain a material fact. This testimony is often necessary "to inform 
the trier of fact of the sequence of events leading up to the crime in order to complete 
the narrative of the events." Linsky, supra, at 82. For example, it can help the trier 
of fact understand why a victim may have stayed with her abuser when he suggests 
fabrication of a charged offense or why she did not immediately scream for help when 
he made contact in violation of a protective order. Id. It can help establish an escalating 
pattern of violence and clarify the violence-triggering potential of seemingly minor 
incidents. See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: 
Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. Cal L. Rev. 1463, 1496 (1996) ("individual acts of abuse 
form[] a blueprint that details how [a defendant attempts] to control the victim" leading, 
in some cases, to "murder as the final act of control"). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in the context of child abuse, that evidence of 
prior violent acts toward a child are relevant, "to establish not merely a general disposition 
for violence or ill-will towards all children, but to establish a specific pattern of behavior 
of the defendant toward one particular child, the victim." State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 
539, 546 (Utah 1983). Similarly, the Supreme Court held admissible evidence of an 
"ongoing behavior pattern" of sexual abuse between one defendant and one particular 
child victim. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ^ 26. The pattern of escalating violence that 
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attends domestic abuse of a spouse or partner is also an "ongoing behavior pattern" and 
"a specific pattern of behavior of the defendant toward one particular . . . victim." 
Testimony about the May 18 assault was relevant in this case, not to show a general 
disposition for violence or ill-will, but to show defendant's pattern of behavior toward 
Ms. Palmer. Defendant's prior acts demonstrated that, when agitated, he expressed his 
anger toward her by physically and verbally threatening her life. Further, the May 18 
assault also provided evidence of his pattern of responding to Ms. Palmer's "survival 
mode" defense. The evidence made it more likely that defendant left without killing 
Ms. Palmer, not because he walked away after being tricked, but because Ms. Palmer, 
although frightened, had the presence of mind to respond to his violence by going into 
a "survival mode." 
4. Rebuttal of fabrication and justification defenses 
Evidence of prior domestic abuse is also relevant to rebut claims that a victim had 
a motive to fabricate the charges against the defendant or that some of the victim's 
allegations were the result of a recent fabrication. Such evidence also tends to refute 
a defense of justification. See Linsky, supra, at 86. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in the context of rape, that other crimes 
evidence—even evidence involving other victims—is admissible to combat a defense 
of consent and to rebut a defense theory based on fabrication. See Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 5 9 , \ 25. 
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Testimony about the May 18 assault was relevant to refute defendant's allegations 
that Ms. Palmer had fabricated the story, i.e., that she had invited him to her home "under 
a ruse to get [him] in trouble." R. 220:331. It was also relevant to rebut his claim that 
he grabbed the gun only to defend himself against Ms. Palmer's threats to kill him. 
The fact that defendant had assaulted Ms. Palmer before, that he had caused injuries 
requiring medical treatment, and that she had obtained a protective order showed her 
fear of him and made it less likely that she would have invited him over to talk with 
no other adults present. Following the assault, she was, in fact, so afraid that she and 
her children stayed with her parents, only visiting the family home at certain times, again 
showing the improbability of any invitation. 
The trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior acts of domestic 
violence. The evidence was admissible, as numerous courts have held, for valid non-
character purposes. 
B. Evidence of the May assault was relevant under rule 402 to prove facts material 
to the crime charged. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided" by constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. That evidence 
must, however, tend to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged. Decorso, 
1999 UT 57, f 22. Testimony of defendant's previous domestic violence history was 
relevant for the purposes discussed in point IA, above. It helped demonstrate that defendant 
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acted intentionally and knowingly and rebutted his defense that Ms. Palmer had tricked 
him and fabricated her testimony in an attempt to frame him. 
C. The probative value of evidence of the May incident was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Evidence relevant for non-character purposes is admissible unless the "probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. Factors relevant to a rule 403 review 
include the strength of the other misconduct evidence, the similarities between the crimes, 
the interval between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of other proof, 
and "the degree to which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Evidence of the May assault was strong. Ms. Palmer's allegations that defendant 
had choked her into unconsciousness were corroborated by physical evidence of finger-like 
bruises on her neck. R. 220:103. The crimes were similar in that defendant's repeatedly 
choking Ms. Palmer into unconsciousness and his pointing a gun at her head both threatened 
death. Further, they both involved the same perpetrator and the same victim. The interval 
between the two crimes was short—less than three months. The evidence was important, 
especially in light of defendant's claim that Ms. Palmer had framed him and defense 
counsel's suggestions that the children's testimony was coached See R. 220:331, 221:100-
101. Finally, evidence of the May assault was not evidence that "would rouse the jury 
to overmastering hositlity." Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 50 (internal quotation marks and 
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citation omitted). While the May assault was violent, testimony about that assault was 
not more likely to arouse the jury's hostilities than testimony of the charged offense, 
testimony that defendant held a gun to Ms. Palmer's head and told her that she was going 
to die. See R. 220:125. 
The trial court properly admitted the evidence. Its probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. 
D. Evidence of the prior assault was harmless. 
Even had evidence of the May assault been improperly admitted, admission of that 
evidence was harmless in the context of the evidence as a whole. "Harmless errors are 
errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "For an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence 
in the verdict." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "The more evidence 
supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful error." Id. 
This was not a "be said"-"she said" case. Ms. Palmer's testimony here was supported 
by her children's testimony, by the gun seller's testimony, by defendant's own statements 
on Ms. Palmer's answering machine, by defendant's furtive behavior in approaching 
the home and his flight following the incident, and by the inconsistencies inherent in 
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defendant's own testimony. In light of the State's overwhelming evidence against 
defendant, admission of the prior assault evidence was harmless. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE FOUND 
AT DEFENDANT'S ABANDONED APARTMENT 
On rebuttal, the State called Detective Danielle Croyle to testify about what she 
found in defendant's apartment when she entered the apartment with management after 
management had completed abandonment procedures. R. 221:69-70. Defendant objected, 
arguing that the search may have been conducted while the apartment was still in 
defendant's possession and without a search warrant. Id. at 70. Although the objection 
was made mid-trial and not in the context of a pretrial motion to suppress, the trial court 
heard brief arguments from both parties and then ruled that the premises had been returned 
to management and that defendant therefore had no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in them. Id. at 70-71. 
Following the ruling, Detective Croyle testified that the caller I.D. in the apartment 
registered fifty-nine calls, the last a call from Ms. Palmer's telephone number on August 
3, 1999. Id. at 71-72. Defendant claims on appeal that this testimony should have been 
excluded. Br. Apit. at 22-26. Defendant apparently hoped to exclude the testimony 
because it tended to refute defendant's claim that Ms. Palmer had called him on August 
11 and invited him to her home the following day. See R. 220:307-308. 
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The testimony was properly admitted. Defendant had abandoned the property, thereby 
terminating any reasonable expectation of privacy he may previously have had with respect 
to the property. Management was therefore in a position to give effective consent. Further, 
even if management did not have actual authority to consent to the search, Detective 
Croyle reasonably relied on the apartment manager's apparent authority to consent. 
In any case, admission of the evidence was harmless. 
A. A renter who abandons his apartment has no justified expectation of privacy 
with respect to the premises, and a search of the apartment does not violate 
his Fourth Amendment rights. 
"Whether an individual has an expectation of privacy [in rented premises] is based 
on a two-prong test: 'First the individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy, 
and second, that subjective expectation must be reasonable." State v. Loya, 2001 UT 
App 3, f 10, 18 P.3d 1116 (addressing abandonment of a motel room). 
A renter who leaves his apartment with no apparent intention to return and make 
further use of it has, for Fourth Amendment purposes, abandoned the apartment. See 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(a) (3d ed. 1996). Having abandoned the 
apartment, the one-time occupant no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the premises. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 686 P.2d 750, 764 (Ariz. 1984) (when substantial 
evidence shows abandonment, trial court may properly determine that defendant has 
no expectation of privacy and no standing to contest search); see also LaFave, supra, 
§ 2.3(a). 
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A renter's expectation of privacy in an apartment is not necessarily coterminous 
with his legal right to occupy it. See id. A renter who is delinquent in his rental payment 
does not necessarily lose his justified expectation of privacy in his apartment. Id. On 
the other hand, a renter who has paid his rent to the end of the month, but leaves earlier 
under circumstances indicating that he does not intend to return and use the apartment, 
may no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the apartment. Id. at 
§§ 2.3(a), 11.3(a); see also People v. Morrison, 583 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1978) (defendant 
who had paid half of the first month's rent, but removed his clothing, bedding, and personal 
effects after only one week and never returned to the apartment had abandoned the 
premises); Bloodworth v. State, 212 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. 1975) (finding abandonment where 
defendant had left premises even though he may have retained the lawful right to 
possession); State v. Grissom, 840 P.2d 1142 (Kan. 1992) (defendant, who told partner 
he was going to California, loaded most of his personal effects before departing, and 
told partner he could have the remaining contents of the apartment, had abandoned the 
apartment even though the rental period had not expired). 
Abandonment can occur even when personal property is left behind. See, e.g., 
United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) (defendants had abandoned 
the premises notwithstanding their failure to take their weapons, clothing, and belongings 
where all circumstances indicated that they had fled to another city to avoid arrest); 
Grissom, 840 P.2d at 1142. The key question is whether fhe defendant retained a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the premises said to be abandoned. 
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Here, sometime shortly before or shortly after the August 12 incident, defendant 
left a letter saying that he had quit his work as a maintenance worker at the apartment 
complex where he lived. R. 221:64-65. The manager knew that defendant received 
a rental discount in connection with his employment and believed that his rent was deducted 
from his paycheck on a bi-weekly basis. Id. at 63-64. She therefore thought that he had 
vacated his apartment in connection with his resignation and conducted a walk-through 
inspection of defendant's apartment. Id. at 65. 
When the manager found some personal items remaining in the apartment, she posted 
a legal pink slip, indicating abandonment, and, on the advice of her attorney, locked 
the apartment without removing defendant's belongings. Id. at 65, 69. She then waited 
the requisite number of days before entering the apartment to box up defendant's goods 
and to prepare the apartment for new occupants. Id. at 65-66, 69. Prior to disturbing 
defendant's goods, she contacted the police to allow them to examine the apartment. 
Id. at 69. 
Detective Croyle, who had spoken with the manager about defendant's apartment 
on August 12, entered the apartment at the manager's invitation. Id. at 69-70. Detective 
Croyle testified that she entered sometime near the end of August or the beginning of 
September. Id. at 68. Detective Croyle had, at the time, independent verification that 
defendant had abandoned the apartment. She had retrieved messages left by defendant 
on Suann Palmer's message machine. R. 220:223. Among them was this message, left 
sometime after the incident on Thursday, August 12, but before Detective Croyle retrieved 
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the messages the following day: "Another thing is anything in my apartment is >ours, 
there's not a whole lot. Throw anything you want in the dumpster I don't (unintel). 
I would be out by Friday." State's Exhibit 13. 
Under the circumstances, it is clear that defendant had left his apartment with no 
intent to return. He therefore had no subjective expectation of privacy in the apartment 
or its contents. He had to assume that management would enter the property to prepare 
it for re-rental. Further, even if he had some subjective expectation of privacy, that 
expectation would not have been reasonable. 
Defendant argues that the landlord and detective may have entered the apartment 
prior to the expiration of the rental term. Br. Aplt. at 25. Defendant, however, offered 
no evidence regarding the rental term. The apartment manager, while not absolutely 
certain, stated that she believed that defendant's rent was deducted from his maintenance 
worker payroll on a bi-weekly basis. R. 221:63-64. In that case, it appears unlikely 
that defendant's rent was paid through the end of August. 
In any case, even if defendant had paid his rent through August, he had left the 
apartment with no apparent intent to return. Defendant's telephone messages suggest 
that he may have been considering suicide. State's Exhibit 13 (telling Ms. Palmer "I 
just want it to end and it is going to end sometime tonight... so when you wake up 
tomorrow you won't have to worry about me no more . . . please find a way . . . to get 
me buried"). At a minimum, they indicated that he had no further use for the items he 
left in the apartment and was not going to return to it. State's Exhibit 13 (telling Ms. 
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Palmer that she could pick up defendant's check and, while there was not much left 
in his apartment, she could take anything she wanted and throw the rest away). His 
testimony about his forty-seven-day wanderings between the date of the offense and 
the date he was apprehended, despite its contradictions, suggested that he was trying 
to avoid arrest. Compare R. 220:341 ("I didn't leave the state, b u t . . . I left this area") 
with R. 221:16-33 (defendant's account of traveling to Georgia). He told his landlord 
he was quitting. R. 221:64-65. Even if defendant had paid his rent through August 
31, all of these circumstances indicated that defendant had nonetheless abandoned his 
apartment.2 
Alternatively, the search was reasonable under the "apparent authority" doctrine 
enunciated in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187 (1990). This doctrine holds that 
when "the police reasonably believe[] that a third person ha[s] authority to consent to 
[a] search, the search [does] not violate the Fourth Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah App. 
1991). "The apparent authority rule rests upon the proposition that the regulation of 
2Defendant no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. In addition, 
having abandoned the apartment, he had no standing to challenge the search of the 
apartment. In determining whether defendant has standing, a court may look not only at 
the facts known to the police officers at the time of the search, but also to any additional 
facts known at the time a motion to suppress is made. LaFave, supra, § 11.3(a). Here, 
prior to making his motion to suppress, defendant had testified that he left Ogden soon 
after the August 12 incident, traveled as far away as Georgia during the next month, and 
was apprehended by the police after returning to Utah. R. 221:16-34. His own testimony 
demonstrates that he made no attempt to return to his apartment or to pay any further rent. 
Id. 
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police behavior is what the fourth amendment is all about; suppression based upon a 
hindsight determination that there was not actual authority would have no deterrent effect, 
for in future cases the police can only act upon what reasonably appears to be true." 
LaFave, supra, § 8.3(g), at 761 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, the police investigator acted under the reasonable belief that the apartment 
manager had authority to consent to the search. The investigator did not rely merely 
on the manager's position as a representative of the landlord. Rather, the investigator 
also knew that defendant had left a telephone message telling Ms. Palmer she could 
keep or throw away anything left in defendant's apartment; that defendant had given 
the manager a letter terminating his employment at the apartment complex; that following 
a walk-through inspection, the manager had locked the apartment and posted it for 
abandonment; and that the manager had not called to permit the police inspection until, 
two to three weeks after the August 12 incident, she had completed the abandonment 
process and was ready to clean out the apartment and re-rent it. R. 220:224; 221:69-70. 
Under the circumstances, the investigator reasonably believed that the manager had authority 
to consent to the search, and no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
B. Even if the trial court erred when it admitted evidence obtained through the 
search of defendant's apartment, admission of the evidence was harmless. 
During rebuttal, the State introduced the caller identification register for defendant's 
telephone found during Detective Croyle's search of defendant's apartment. The State 
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apparently hoped to refute defendant's claim that Ms. Palmer had called him on August 
11 to invite him to her home on August 12. 
Introduction of the evidence was harmless. First, as caller ID users are aware, not 
every phone call made to a telephone number will be included in the caller ID register. 
When a call is answered quickly, time is frequently insufficient to permit the electronic 
processing necessary to register an incoming call. The jury may therefore have accorded 
little significance to the absence of a registered call from Ms. Palmer on August 11. 
Second, the evidence was inconsequential in the context of the State's case. The 
evidence against defendant in this case was overwhelming. Ms. Palmer testified against 
defendant. Her testimony was corroborated by the testimony of her children. In addition, 
defendant made numerous incriminating statements in calls following the incident that 
were recorded on Ms. Palmer's answering machine. In light of this testimony and the 
internal inconsistencies in defendant's story, no reasonable probability exists that evidence 
from defendant's caller ID affected the outcome of the verdict. 
III. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE DID NOT MAKE CERTAIN 
OBJECTIONS AND REQUESTS OR BECAUSE HE DID NOT 
ADEQUATELY PREPARE DEFENSE WITNESSES 
Defendant claims that trial counsel's performance was deficient because he 
• "failed to object to the State's introduction of allegations of domestic violence 
and protective order violations which were not prosecuted for lack of evidence"; 
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"failed to object to the introduction of an investigation of an attempted break-in 
at the family's home which yielded no evidence that defendant was involved"; 
• "failed to request a curative instruction following an unresponsive and 
inflammatory answer to one fo the prosecutor's statements alleging defendant, 
on a prior occasion, had assaulted her and held her 'hostage'"; 
• "failed to request a mistrial or curative instruction after [Ms. Palmer] testified 
about defendant's prior conviction for simple assault and other prior bad acts"; 
• "failed to prepare witnesses to testify on the defendant's behalf; and 
• "failed to request a jury instruction on defendant's theory of self-defense." 
Br. Aplt. at 27. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that trial counsel 
"rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him.,f State 
v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, f20, 984 P.2d 376 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Defendant must "identify specific acts or omissions that fell outside the wide range of 
professional assistance and illustrate that, absent those acts or omissions, there is a 
reasonable probability of a more favorable result." Id. (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Failure "to make motions or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f34, 989 P.2d 
52 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Further, "[i]n determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, . . . [a 
reviewing court] presume[s] that counsel has rendered adequate assistance. . . . Thus, 
if the challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, [the court] 
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will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel/' State v. Parker, 2000 UT 
51, | 10, 4 P.3d 778 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A failure to object 
does not constitute deficient performance where "counsel may have reasonably believed 
that any objection would have placed undue and unfavorable emphasis1' on some point 
or where counsel may have "made a deliberate and tactical choice in not focusing the 
jury's attention" on a matter." Id. at f 11. 
Finally, "[t]o determine whether there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable 
outcome, [the reviewing court] considers] the totality of the evidence taking into account 
such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated 
effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 
f 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
A. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to evidence of unprosecuted 
protective order violations. 
Evidence of defendant's domestic violence history was admissible for the reasons 
detailed in Point I, above. Trial counsel objected to the most serious incident of prior 
domestic violence, the May 18 assault, when the prosecution asked its first witness, Suann 
Palmer, about the incident. R. 220:99. The trial court, however, properly ruled that 
the testimony was admissible to show intent and motive. Id. Trial counsel was not 
defective for not making futile objections to every subsequent question about defendant's 
domestic violence history, including questions about acts that triggered investigations 
for possible violations of protective orders. Additionally, as explained under Point I, 
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testimony about these acts was relevant to rebut defendant's claim that Ms. Palmer invited 
him to her home. 
Further, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. He has not shown that, absent 
admission of the evidence, there was a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. 
B. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to evidence of an attempted 
break-in at the family home. 
Testimony regarding the attempted break-in was relevant to establish the background 
for this offense. For reasons detailed under Point I, above, it was therefore admissible. 
Further, defense counsel may have made a strategic decision not to object to testimony 
about the incident, which was not tied to defendant, because defense counsel did not 
want to suggest to the jury, by way of objection, that the evidence was detrimental to 
defendant. When damaging evidence is presented, counsel may object to its admission 
or he may respond to the evidence, asking questions that cast the evidence in a light 
more favorable to defendant. Counsel here chose the latter course, asking Ms. Palmer 
on cross-examination whether she had "any real information" that defendant was the 
person who tried to pry open her windows. R. 220:145. 
In any case, defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate prejudice. He has 
not shown that, absent the evidence counsel might have challenged, there would have 
been a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. The other evidence presented 
by the State was sufficiently strong to make it unlikely that the jury accorded any substantial 
weight to testimony about an attempted break-in by an unknown person. 
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C. Defense counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a curative instruction 
when the victim testified that defendant had, on a prior occasion, assaulted 
her and held her "hostage." 
During direct examination, Suann Palmer testified to the May 18 incident where 
defendant repeatedly choked her into unconsciousness. R. 220:101. When asked why 
he stopped, she testified that she "went into survivor mode" and said, "Please don't kill 
me, I wan[t] [to] make this marriage work." Id. When asked whether she stayed with 
defendant for the rest of the night, Ms. Palmer stated, "He then held [me] hostage for 
an hour and a half." Id. 
Defendant objected to the "holding hostage" language, and the court sustained the 
objection because her testimony was non-responsive. Id. at 102. Trial counsel did not 
ask for a curative instruction. Id. Defendant now argues that trial counsel was ineffective 
because he did not request a curative instruction. 
Not asking for a curative instruction was not objectively deficient performance. 
The trial court sustained the objection, suggesting to the jury that this testimony was 
improper because it was unresponsive. R. 220:101-102. Nothing, however, supports 
the claim that the testimony was inadmissible. The court had, in fact, already ruled that 
testimony regarding the incident was admissible. See Point I, above. Had defendant 
asked for a curative instruction, the State may have chosen to further examine Ms. Palmer 
about whether she was, in fact, held hostage. As it was, the State simply continued its 
questioning to elicit testimony that Ms. Palmer remained in the home for an hour and 
a half after which her father took her to the hospital. Defense counsel apparently made 
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a strategic decision (1) not to call additional attention to the comment and (2) not to 
prod further State questioning about why Ms. Palmer used the term "hostage." 
In any event, defendant has not shown prejudice. Ms. Palmer's use of the term 
"hostage" had little significance compared to the other details of the choking incident. 
There is no reasonable probability that absent her use of the term, the verdict would 
have been different. 
D. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting a mistrial or curative 
instruction when, in response to defendant's questions, the victim testified that 
defendant had been convicted of simple assault. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Palmer whether she had any contact 
with defendant following entry of the protective orders. R. 220:167. Stating that it was 
"a long story," Ms. Palmer then testified that defendant had appeared at a hearing at 
which she was not present, pled guilty to simple assault, and received permission to 
have some limited and restricted contact with her. Id. Trial counsel did not object or 
move to strike the testimony. Id. On appeal, defendant argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he did not request a mistrial or curative instruction. Br. Aplt. at 
32. 
The trial court had already admitted evidences of defendant's prior crimes, and 
the jury already knew that defendant had assaulted Ms. Palmer. That testimony was 
admissible for the reasons explained in Point I, above. Trial counsel may reasonably 
have concluded that any motion for a mistrial or curative instruction would be futile. 
Further, knowing that any objection might call the jury's attention to the assault conviction, 
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trial counsel may have made a strategic decision not to object. Defense counsel may, 
in fact, have considered the testimony helpful because it clarified that defendant was 
not under a total communication ban and that it was not necessarily wrong for him to 
have some communication with Ms. Palmer. 
In any case, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the testimony. 
In view of overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is not likely that, absent Ms. Palmer's 
testimony about defendant's guilty plea, the jury would have returned a different verdict. 
E. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not adequately preparing defense witnesses. 
Defendant argues that trial counsel failed to adequately prepare defense witnesses 
because they (1) had to refer to notes during testimony, (2) could not remember the dates 
of certain events, or (3) were called at the last minute. See Br. Aplt. at 34-37. Defendant 
has not shown that trial counsel's performance was deficient. He has not alleged or 
shown that greater preparation would have made testimony clearer or more specific or 
that defense counsel could or should have earlier contacted any witness called at the 
last minute. 
In any case, defendant has not shown prejudice. Defendant has not indicated what 
different testimony might have been offered had the witnesses been more carefully prepared. 
Thus, he has not shown that greater preparation would likely have affected the verdict. 
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F. Trial counsel was not ineffective for not "requesting] a jury instruction on 
defendant's theory of self-defense." 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not seek a self-
defense jury instruction. Br. Aplt. at 37. Trial counsel was not deficient, and defendant 
was not prejudiced. 
Trial counsel's determination to forego a factually unsupportable defense does not 
constitute deficient performance. State v. Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, f 11, 46 P.3d 
761. Even where a defense is factually supportable, counsel is not deficient for failing 
to ask for a jury instruction inconsistent with the defense he has chosen to present. Id. 
at f 18. Further, where failure to make the defense might be considered sound trial strategy, 
appellate courts will not presume inadequate performance. Id. at f 8. 
Defendant claimed that Ms. Palmer framed him—that she got him over to her home 
on a "ruse," intending to get him into trouble. R. 220:331. Trial counsel therefore 
attempted to present a fabrication defense. The fabrication defense potentially explained 
the course of defendant's behavior—why he went to Ms. Palmer's home, why she might 
have invited him in, and why he might have entered despite the prohibitions of the 
protective order. 
Defendant, however, muddied the waters when he asserted his belief that Ms. Palmer 
both intended to kill him and wanted to get him into trouble. R. 220:331. Had Ms. 
Palmer intended to get rid of him by getting him in trouble, she would not have needed 
to kill him. Had she intended to kill him, she would not have needed to get him in trouble. 
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Defense counsel, perhaps believing that the jury might be skeptical of defendant's 
rather inconsistent assertions, apparently made a strategic decision to present a fabrication 
defense built on the theory that Ms. Palmer was trying to get rid of defendant by fabricating 
her account of the incident. He argued in closing that Ms. Palmer's version of the incident 
was a "Pinocchio story" that changed over time as she told it to different witnesses. 
R. 221:93. Defense counsel stated: "Our theory of the case is, is it's a set-up. She does 
want to get rid of Rick. She does want Rick out of her life. She does have plan." Id. 
at 97. 
Defense counsel then argued that the evidence suggested that Ms. Palmer and Michelle 
Causey, knowing of the protective order excluding defendant from Ms. Palmer's home, 
had a plan to trick defendant into violating the order and have Ms. Causey present to 
act as a witness. Id. He argued that Ms. Palmer had coached the children's testimony: 
"You've got to wonder, how many times has the mom told the kids this story? Now 
you've got to also wonder, they call him a manipulator. Who is the real manipulator 
of these children? They never saw any of this stuff that they're talking about." Id. at 
101. 
Trial counsel concluded his closing statement focusing on issues of credibility and 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 102-106. He also argued lack of evidence to show a confinement 
or restraint sufficient to support an aggravated kidnapping charge. Id. at 106-107. He 
never once, however, referred to defendant's statement that he had grabbed the gun from 
Ms. Palmer because she was threatening his life. 
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Having made a strategic decision to argue credibility, defense counsel reasonably 
determined not to raise a self-defense theory based on defendant's apparently self-
contradictory testimony. Trial counsel may, in fact, have strategically avoided all reference 
to defendant's testimony that Ms. Palmer executed two inconsistent plans to get rid of 
him—killing him and tricking him into a protective order violation. Under the 
circumstances, defense counsel also may have made a strategic decision not to request 
a self-defense instruction. 
In any case, defendant has shown no prejudice. The jury clearly made all credibility 
assessments in favor of the victim. A self-defense instruction would have helped defendant 
only if the jury had believed his testimony and then only if the State had suggested that 
grabbing the gun, under defendant's version of the facts, was unjustified. 
Further, defendant did not argue that Ms. Palmer's behavior required any act of 
self-defense. He claimed, rather, that he seized the gun from her and then pointed it 
at her, not to defend himself, but because the incident had caused him to "feel so many 
emotions." Id. at 328. Thus, counsel may have determined that the instruction would 
not have been helpful. 
In sum, defendant has not shown how a self-defense instruction would have helped 
his case or, given the overwhelming evidence against him, any probability that the verdict 
would have been different, had the instruction been given. 
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IV. 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING; CHARGES DO 
NOT MERGE AND A SINGLE CONVICTION CANNOT MERGE 
Defendant claims that any confinement of Ms. Palmer was "inconsequential and 
incidental to the crime of aggravated assault." Br. Aplt. at 40. He therefore argues that 
the evidence did not suffice to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Br. Aplt. 
at 38-39. Defendant errs in his characterization of the confinement at issue here. 
Defendant's acts were sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
Defendant also challenges the denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that 
the aggravated kidnapping charge should have merged with an aggravated assault charge 
dismissed prior to trial. Id. Defendant's cites State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, f 12, 
24 P.3d 993, and State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, \ 23, 994 P.2d 1243, for support of 
his merger argument. Defendant misapprehends the precedent established by Lopez 
and Finlayson. The merger doctrine applies only to convictions, not charges, and is 
inapplicable where a defendant is convicted of a single offense. 
A. The evidence sufficed to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
1. Defendant's insufficiency claim is not properly before this Court. 
A defendant must preserve any claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
by proper motion or objection in the trial court. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ fl[ 14-17, 
10 P.3d 346. Preservation is required '"unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional 
circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Id. at f 11 (citation omitted). This Court 
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may decline to consider an unpreserved issue on appeal where a defendant does not argue 
"exceptional circumstances" or "plain error." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant did not preserve his insufficiency claim below. He argues neither 
"exceptional circumstances" nor "plain error" on appeal. This Court should decline 
to review this claim. 
2. Defendant has not properly marshaled the evidence. 
Defendant also has not properly marshaled the evidence on this issue. To prevail 
on a claim of insufficient evidence, a defendant must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports the jury's verdict and then show how this marshaled evidence, when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, is insufficient to support the verdict. See State 
v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 (explaining same marshaling requirement 
for challenging trial court's findings); Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
Marshaling requires the defendant to gather all the evidence that supports the verdict 
and then explain how that evidence is not enough to sustain the conviction. See Gamblin, 
200o UT 44, f 17 n.2. "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes 
and fully assume die adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
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1315 (Utah App. 1991). After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, 
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. 
Defendant has not fulfilled the marshaling requirement. He has simply alleged 
in a single sentence prefacing his merger argument that the evidence did not support 
the jury's verdict. See Br. Aplt. at 38. 
3. In any event the evidence was more than sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-302 (1999), the version of the statute applicable when 
the charged offense was committed, delineates the elements of aggravated kidnapping: 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or 
knowingly, without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by 
any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight 
after the attempt or commission of kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, 
or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
or 
(b) with intent: 
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to 
compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear 
from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(iv) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(v) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter. 
Evidence sufficed to support a finding that defendant intentionally and knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, seized, confined, detained, 
and transported the victim. After Ms. Palmer asked defendant to wait at the door while 
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she retrieved his bowling ball, he forced himself into the home, shoved her inside, closed 
and locked the front door, and pointed a gun at her head. R. 220:118-121. When she 
attempted to escape through the back door, he slammed it shut and locked it. Id. at 121-123. 
He then grabbed and threw her into the bedroom, and closed the bedroom door. Id. 
at 124-125. Further, the evidence suffices to show that he possessed and threatened 
the use of a gun while confining her. Id. at 118-121, 125. Alternatively, the evidence 
suffices to show that he seized and confined her with the intent to inflict bodily injury 
or terrorize her. He both held the gun toward her head and told her, "You want a divorce? 
You are going to die. I'm going to kill you." Id. at 125. Evidence therefore suffices 
to support a guilty finding on all elements of the offense. 
B. The merger doctrine is inapplicable in the absence of multiple convictions. 
Defendant argues that '"the aggravated kidnapping charge merged with the aggravated 
assault charge, notwithstanding the State's effort to deprive the defendant of the benefit 
of merger by dismissing the aggravated assault charge right before trial." Br. Aplt. at 
38-39. Citing State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, and State v. Lopez, 2001 
UT App 123, t 12, 24 P.3d 993, defendant claims that "the confinement [here] was 
inconsequential and incidental to the crime of aggravated assault," "inherent in the nature 
of an aggravated assault," and without "significance independent of the aggravated assault." 
Id. at 40-42. Defendant therefore claims that he "should have been afforded the benefit 
of merger of aggravated kidnapping with aggravated assault." Id. at 42. Defendant's 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping could not have merged with a non-existent conviction 
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for aggravated assault. Further, the State properly exercised its discretion to dismiss 
the assault charge. 
1. Statutory merger is inapplicable. 
The doctrine of merger applies where a defendant has been convicted of separate 
offenses on the basis of a single act as prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999), 
which proscribes convictions for both a charged offense and a lesser included offense. 
In other words, the lesser included offenses merge into the greater offense and cannot 
support separate convictions. See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant here was convicted of a single crime. He was not convicted of both 
an offense and of a lesser included offense. He does not and cannot claim merger under 
section 76-1^02. See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 17 n.3, 26 P.3d 223 (holding 
merger claims applicable only to convictions, not to charges). 
2. "Finlayson merger" is inapplicable. 
A distinct, but related merger question arises when defendants are convicted of 
crimes like rape and robbery that involve a necessary detention. See Finlayson, 2000 
UT 10, ^ | 19. When a defendant is convicted of such a crime, an additional conviction 
for kidnapping, based solely on the detention necessary to complete the rape or robbery 
(the "host crime"), may result in "double punishment for essentially the same act." Id. 
Therefore, "[t]o sustain convictions for both kidnaping and [the host crime], the prosecutor 
must show that the kidnaping detention was longer than the necessary detention involved 
in the commission of the [host crime]" and/or that "the facts establishing the kidnapping 
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detention must not be merely incidental to the [host crime], but separate and independent 
therefrom." Id. 
"Finlayson merger" has potential application only where a victim is convicted both 
of kidnapping and of a host crime that involves a necessary detention. It does not apply 
where a defendant is convicted of a single crime, no matter what charges may actually 
or potentially have been filed. See Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 17 n.3 {"Finlayson is 
not applicable [where court is] not dealing with convictions for aggravated kidnaping, 
but merely aggravated kidnaping charges"). It does not apply when a defendant is convicted 
of a crime that includes no "necessary detention." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 19; see 
Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, fflf 18-20. It does not apply even where a defendant is 
convicted of a "host crime"—i.e., another crime that includes a necessary detention—unless 
the seizure or detention is 
"merely incidental to the other crime," 
• "inherent in the nature of the of the other crime," and 
• without independent significance, i.e., it does not make the host crime 
"substantially easier of commission" or harder to detect. 
See State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720 (Kan. 1976) (cited in Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 23). 
"Finlayson merger" is not applicable to defendant's case. Defendant here was 
convicted of a single offense, aggravated kidnapping. Because defendant was not charged 
with a second offense, he was not even exposed to possible double punishment. 
Further, even had defendant been convicted of both aggravated kidnapping and 
aggravated assault, "Finlayson merger" principles would not have applied. Aggravated 
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assault, unlike rape and robbery, cannot be a host crime because it involves no inherent 
detention. See State v Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, f 14, 24 P.3d 993 (no inherent detention 
in aggravated assault); State v Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, fl 18-20 (no inherent detention 
in aggravated burglary). 
Finally, even if aggravated assault could serve as "host crime," the seizure and 
detention in this case were not "merely incidental" to an aggravated assault or "inherent 
in the nature" of an aggravated assault. Had defendant been charged with aggravated 
assault, his acts of pointing the gun toward Ms. Palmer's head and threatening to kill 
her would have sufficed to support a conviction. No detention or confinement was 
necessary to accomplish those acts, much less the bolting of both doors against the victim's 
efforts to escape. See Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, f 13 (defendant "could have stabbed 
[the victim] at any point after he grabbed the knife without confining or moving her"). 
Further, the seizure and detention here had independent significance because they 
made the aggravated assault easier to commit and harder to detect. Forcing Ms. Palmer 
inside the house and locking her in to prevent her escape made it easier for defendant 
to hold the gun to her head and threaten her with death. Moving her from the porch—in 
public view—into the house's interior made detecting the acts constituting aggravated 
assault more difficult. 
For all of the above reasons, defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping 
did not merge and could not have merged with a charge or conviction for aggravated 
assault. 
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3. The State properly exercised its discretion to dismiss the aggravated assault 
charge. 
Defendant suggests that the State acted improperly when it dismissed the aggravated 
assault charge. Defendant speculates that absent the dismissal he might have received 
a less severe sentence: he might have been convicted of both aggravated assault and 
aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated kidnapping might then have merged into the 
aggravated assault conviction under Finlay son. 
The "prosecutor's decision [of] what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in 
his [or her] discretion."3 State ex rel W.C.P., 1999 UT App 35, ^ 22, 974 P.2d 302 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also State 
v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 403 (Utah 1989) (discussing prosecutorial discretion at length), 
rev'd on other grounds, State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995). The prosecutor properly 
exercised his discretion when he determined to dismiss the aggravated assault charge 
and proceed on the aggravated kidnapping charge. 
Further, this case presents no Shondel issue. Defendant implies that the prosecutor 
impermissibly chose defendant's penalty by proceeding on the aggravated kidnapping 
charge and dismissing the aggravated assault charge. While a prosecutor has the discretion 
to choose what offenses to charge, if two offenses have "wholly duplicative" elements, 
a defendant is entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty, even if charged and convicted 
3The prosecutor may not, however, deliberately base his decision on "an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." State v. 
Bell 785 P.2d 390, 403 (Utah 1989), rev'don other grounds, State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1995). 
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of the offense carrying the greater penalty. State v Bryan, 7'• * i ..; ~: , lb} aa 
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I low e\ er onl) if the twu uiienses are "wholly duplicative." It is there inapplicable in 
this case. To prove aggravated kidnapping, the prosecution must show seizure, confinement, 
detention or transportation of the v ictim, an element not required to prove aggravated 
ass.! I in ill I 11,i»i i
 (i»i (iinn I H.illi ( IINIC \IIUI ) \ (ii,1 Mf//i I !( lb, ! m{r \\\\\ ; "V).* \\\\ 
For the reasons detailed under point IV(BX2), defendant's speculation about a potential 
merger is based on an erroneous view of the Finlayson doctrine, In any case, the State 
acted properly when it dismissed the aggravated assault coi int. 
V. 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS, IF ANY, DOES NOT 
UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED A FAIR 
TRIAL 
I i if >rs uioiigii mi Kin uiulii.il ml |, IIJJIIIKJS.S iiiyi1!. IH iijiiiii iiiiiiiM.i<i In, • unik'nniiH' 
the reviewing court ;> confidence in the verdict See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-
1209 (Utah 1993). Defendant has identified no error But if errors occurred, their 
cumulative effect does not undermine confidence in the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1 I A person commits aggravated assault il he commits assault as deltoid in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodil) injury to another; oi 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (I)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
0 I A violation of Subsection (1 )(b) is a third degree felony. 
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnaping if the person intentionally or knowingly, 
w ithout authority of law and against the will of the victim, b\ any means and in any 
manner, seizes, confines, detains, or transports the victim: 
(a) and in committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of the kidnaping, the actor possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(hi with intent: 
(i) to hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third person to 
engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the \ ictim or another; 
(i\) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or politica I I I i m 111 11 i >r 
(\ ) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter 
(21 A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit if the 
victim is mentally incompetent or younger than 16 years and the detention or moving is 
accomplished without the effective consent of the victim's custodial parent, guardian, or 
person acting in loco parentis to the victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by
 i m p n s o n m e n t tor an 
indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life 
Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406 
Rule 404 Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct, exceptions, other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character 
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except* 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence ot a \ n rtimmi 11 nl I Intuitu OIIMMHV HI mused, 
or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character ot \ ictim. E\ idence of a pertinent trait of character of the v ictim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence ot a 
(Ji.uacter trait of peacefiilness of the victim offered bv the prosecution in a homicide case 
to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor, 
(3) Character of witness Fvidence of the character ot i witness, as provided in Rules 
607, 608, ™d 609. 
I h I Other crimes, wrongs, or acts Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character ot a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, prepaiatum plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake oi 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant tor 
a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 40? and 401. 
